

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MUSCAT 01027 01 OF 03 250947Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 H-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08  
/079 W

-----045706 250949Z /13/11

P R 230540Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4520  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGER GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MUSCAT 1027

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

DEPT ALSO FOR USAID AND ACDA

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, MU  
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTERGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF STATE 167901

WE SUBMIT BELOW THE REPORT ON OMAN THAT WAS REQUESTED BY  
REFTEL AND LATER SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS. THE PARA-  
GRAPHS ARE NUMBERED TO FOLLOW THE SUBSECTIONS OF PARAGRAPH  
3A OF REFTEL, EXCEPT FOR THE LAST PARAGRAPH WHICH IS OUR  
RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPH 3B(3)(D).

(1) U.S. INTEREST IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP AND  
OBJECTIVES THEREOF. BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AS  
JOINT CONTROLLER, WITH IRAN, OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ AT THE  
MOUTH OF THE PERSIAN GULF, OMAN'S SECURITY IS OR SHOULD BE  
A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO THE USG. ITS LOCATION  
ON THE NORTHWESTERN LITTORAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MUSCAT 01027 01 OF 03 250947Z

SIZEABLE (THOUGH NOT MAJOR) OIL RESERVES ARE ALSO IM-  
PORTANT. THE USG HAS AN INTEREST IN SEEING THAT A  
GOVERNMENT OF MODERATE, RESPONSIBLE OUTLOOK REMAINS IN  
POWER IN MUSCAT. IT IS ALSO IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO  
KEEP OMAN'S OIL FLOWING TO FRIENDLY MARKETS. CONSEQUENTLY,  
THE USG SHOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO REASONABLE OMANI REQUESTS  
FOR AMERICAN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES THAT MEET A REAL

MILITARY NEED. THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO AVOID BECOMING A MAJOR MILITARY SUPPLIER-- FOR, AS SHOWN BELOW, OMAN'S NEEDS ARE MAINLY MET ELSEWHERE -- BUT RATHER TO SUPPLEMENT THE OMANI ARSENAL WHERE AMERICAN EQUIPMENT FILLS A MUTUALLY PERCEIVED GAP. THUS, WE ENVISAGE A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT CASH-BASIS, SMALL-SCALE FMS PROGRAM. THE INITIATIVE FOR PURCHASES SHOULD GENERALLY COME, AS NOW, FROM THE OMANI SIDE. THE OMANI MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS ENTIRELY CAPABLE OF ASSESSING ITS OWN NEEDS AND OF SEEING WHERE U.S. EQUIPMENT MIGHT HELP. CONCEIVABLY, TRAINING OF OMANI MILITARY PERSONNEL COULD SUPPLEMENT THIS PURCHASE PROGRAM AT SOME STAGE, THOUGH NO SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PIPELINE.

(2) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT AS SEEN BY OMAN, AND STRATEGIES TO COUNTER IT. OMAN HAS SUCCESSFULLY FOUGHT (WITH BRITISH, IRANIAN, AND JORDANIAN HELP) AN INTERNAL INSURGENCY BACKED FROM OUTSIDE BY COMMUNIST STATES. ALTHOUGH THE REBELLION WAS EFFECTIVELY QUELLED IN LATE 1975, SOME LEADING MEMBERS OF THE SUBVERSIVE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN (PFLO) ARE STILL AT LARGE. FURTHERMORE, THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN (PDY), WHICH WAS THE REBELLION'S MAIN OUTSIDE SUPPORTER, KEEPS UP AN ANTI-OMAN POSTURE AND MAY INTENSIFY THIS HOSTILE ATTITUDE FOLLOWING THE RECENT EVENTS IN THE TWO YEMENS. THIS COMBINED INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MUSCAT 01027 01 OF 03 250947Z

IS VIEWED BY OMAN'S GOVERNMENT WITH EVEN GREATER APPREHENSION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN. FURTHER IN THE BACKGROUND IS THE OMANI LEADERSHIP'S FEAR, VAGUELY DEFINED BUT GENUINELY FELT, THAT OMAN IS A TEMPTING PREY FOR "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM" LED FROM MOSCOW. TO COUNTER THESE PERCEIVED THREATS, OMAN CARRIES OUT A RANGE OF POLICIES: (A) IT TRIES TO AWAKEN THE U.S., AS THE WORLD'S PRESUMED ANTI-COMMUNIST CHAMPION, TO THE THREATS AS SEEN BY OMAN. (B)) IT COURTS OMAN'S IRANIAN CONNECTION BUILT UP SINCE THE SHAH SENT TROOPS TO HELP PUT DOWN THE PFLO REBELLION. (C) IT MAINTAINS A STRONG SECURITY-CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS POLICE AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. (D) IT SUSTAINS A STRONGLY ANTI-MOSCOW THEME IN THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED MEDIA, SO AS TO PRESERVE IN THE OMANI PUBLIC THE SAME SENSE OF DANGER THAT THEIR LEADERS PERCEIVE. (E) IT STRIVES TO KEEP THE OMANI ARMED FORCES IN A STATE OF READINESS, WITH MORALE REMAINING HIGH AND EQUIPMENT SUFFICIENTLY MODERN TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE FIREPOWER AND MOBILE, DIVERSIFIED CAPABILITY.

(C) EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT. IN GENERAL,

WHILE WE HAVE VIEWED OMAN'S CONCERN ABOUT -INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM- AS RATHER SHAPELESS AND INCOHERENT, WE HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN SERIOUSLY THEIR FEAR OF THE PDRY. THEY HAVE HAD LONG AND BITTER XPERIENCE WITH THAT COUNTRY, AND NOW THAT EXTREME MARXISTS APPEAR TO HAVE WON THE DAY IN ADEN IT IS EVEN HARDER TO ARGUE AGAINST OMAN'S APPREHENSIONS. TO BE SURE, THE IMMEDIATE PRE-OCCUPATION OF ADEN'S NEW RULERS MAY BE INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION RATHER THAN EXTERNAL ADVENTURE, BUT THE POTENTIAL LONG-TERM POLICY OF THAT GOVERNMENT GIVES MUCH TO WORRY ABOUT. MOREOVER, THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN LEND PLAUSIBILITY EVEN TO OMAN'S WIDER CONCERN ABOUT MOSCOW-CENTERED COMMUNISM. ALTHOUGH WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THE OMANI LEADERSHIP OVERDOES ITS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MUSCAT 01027 01 OF 03 250947Z

CRIS OF ALARM IN THIS RESPECT -- PERHAPS DELIBERATELY FOR POLICY PURPOSES -- WE CANNOT FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT FIND MAJOR FAULT WITH THEIR GENERAL ANXIETY. OMAN'S SENSE OF BEING THE TARGET OF COMBINED INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IS REAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MUSCAT 01027 02 OF 03 051023Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 H-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08  
DRC-01 /080 W

-----113459 051027Z /14/11

P R 230540Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4521  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USCINCEUR VAHINGER GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MUSCAT 1027

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y MRN (1027 VICE 1028)

(4) MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT DESIRED BY OMAN TO MEET THE THREAT. MUCH OF THE DANGER AS SEEN BY OMAN IS OF THE TYPE BEST MET BY GOOD POLICE WORK. THE OMANI GOVERNMENT FULLY REALIZES THIS AND PAYS CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THIS CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, MUCH EFFORT IS ALSO DIRECTED AT THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. IT ONLY IS THE MILITARY VIEWED AS A POSSIBLE BACK-UP FOR THE POLICE, BUT IF THE PFLO INSURGENCY EVER BREAKS OUT ON THE SCALE THAT IT SHOWED BEFORE LATE 1975 IN DHOFAR, THE PROBLEM WILL BECOME A DISTINCTLY MILITARY ONE. FURTHERMORE, ANY OVERTY MOVE BY PDRY ARMED FORCES IN AID OF THE PFLO WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTERED BY OMAN'S MILITARY. FOR THESE REASONS, OMAN STRIVES TO MAINTAIN A TRAINED, MOBILE LAND ARMY (PROBABLY THE MAIN MILITARY ARM AGAINST ANY NEW PFLO UPSURGE) AND SOPHISTICATED HARD-STRIKING AIR AND NAVAL UNITS (TO HELP THE ARMY COUNTER ANY PDRY THRUST AND ALSO TO SUPPORT ITS INTERNAL MOVES AGAINST THE PFLO).

(5) EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF ABOVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN TERMS OF U.S. INTERESTS. A CONFIDENT AND MOTIVATED OMANI MILITARY FORCE THAT CAN DEFEND THE COUNTRY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MUSCAT 01027 02 OF 03 051023Z

AGAINST THE POTENTIAL INTERNAL-EXTERNAL THREAT OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD SEEM TO BE CLEARLY IN THE U.S. INTEREST. OUR MAIN CAVEAT WOULD BE THAT OMAN'S DESIRE FOR MODERN EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT LEAD IT TO BUY OVERLY SOPHISTICATED AND EXPENSIVE EQUIPMENT WHICH IT CANNOT AFFORD. THE THREAT OF INTERNAL SUBVERSION MUST ALSO BE MET IN THE CIVILIAN ECONOMIC SECTOR, AND ANY WEAKENING OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC WELFARE THROUGH UNWISE MILITARY PURCHASES IS AS MUCH A GAIN FOR THE PFLO AND ITS PDY BACKERS AS A MILITARY VICTORY WOULD BE. A BALANCING OF MILITARY NEED AND ECONOMIC COST IS CONSTANTLY NECESSARY.

(6) ECONOMIC IMPACT OF OMANI DEFENSE SPENDING. 8\*9-, HAS CROSSED THE LINE INTO POOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS DEFENSE SPENDING UP TO NOW, IT DID SO WITH THE JUST COMPLETED PURCHASE OF A SQUADRON OF JAGUAR AIRCRAFT AND TWO SQUADRON OF RAPIER AIR-DEFENSE MISSILE FIRING UNITS FROM BRITAIN. LESS BURDENSOME ECONOMICALLY BUT ALSO COSTLY IS THE PURCHASE NOW UNDERWAY, ALSO FROM BRITAIN, OF EXOCET MISSILES AND SEA ARCHER FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR SEVEN FAST PATROL BOATS OF OMAN'S NAVY. THE OMANI ARMY'S PURCHASE OF TEN TOW LAUNCHERS AND 180 TOW MISSILES FROM THE U.S. A FEW YEARS AGO WAS LESS EXPENSIVE THAN EITHER OF THE ABOVE BUT ALSO DEBATABLE IN COST-EFFECTIVENESS. YET ALL OF THESE ITEMS CAN BE DESCRIBED AS MEETING A CONCEIVABLE THREAT, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT TENSIONS HAVE RISEN IN THE SOUTH ARABIAN REGION. OVERALL, OMAN'S DEFENSE SPENDING HAS BEEN SIZEABLE FOR QUITE A FEW YEARS RUNNING. THE

END OF THE DHOFAR WAR HAS PERMITTED SOME REDUCTION, BUT  
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN HIGH FOR THE  
FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IN 1976 SPENDING IN THE DEFENSE  
AND NATIONAL SECURITY CATEGORY WAS 46.7 PERCENT OF TOTAL  
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. IT DROPPED TO 44.1 PERCENT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MUSCAT 01027 02 OF 03 051023Z

IN 1977, A DECLINE ATTRIBUTED NOT ONLY TO THE CONCLUSION  
OF THE DHOFAR HOSTILITIES BUT ALSO TO BETTER ADMINISTRATION.  
THE PURCHASES OF THE MINISTRY DEFENSE HAVE BECOME  
SUBJECT TO TIGHT BUDGET CONTROLS. THIS IS PART OF A  
RATHER STRINGENT GOVERNMENT-WIDE EFFORT TO CONTROL THE  
NATION'S FINANCIAL RESOURCES WHICH ARE NOW SEEN AS IN-  
CREASINGLY LIMITED. THE APPETITE FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT  
WILL THUS BE RESTRICTED BY COMPETITION FOR FUNDS FROM THE  
RATHER AMBITIOUS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND THE BURDEN  
OF MAINTAINING THE BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMIC PLANT  
ALREADY BUILT. THE DESIRE TO UPGRADE SALARY AND OTHER  
STANDARDS OF THE MILITARY FORCES NOW IN BEING WILL ALSO  
LIMIT THE ACQUISITION OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

(7) NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS REPORT.

(8) EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF FMS ITEMS PROJECTED FOR PUR-  
CHASE BY OMAN. BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM CURRENTLY  
PROGRAMMED FOR FUTURE PURCHASE BY OMAN UNDER FMS IS THE  
RE-USUPPLY OF MISSILES FOR ITS PRESENT STOCK OF TOW LAUNCHERS.  
DELIVERY OF 136 MISSILES IS PROJECTED FOR MID-1980. HAVING  
ALREADY ACQUIRED A TOW ARSENAL, THE OMANI ARMY WISHES TO  
KEEP THIS CAPABILITY IN SUBSTANTIAL READINESS INTO THE  
MID-1980', AND IT HAS JUSTIFIED ITS NEED FOR EXACTLY  
136 MISSILES IN DETAIL TO US. WE SUPPORT THIS REQUEST,  
WHICH HAS RECEIVED THE  
EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON AGENCIES  
AS WELL. AMONG OTHER PROJECTED PURCHASES, THE MOST SIG-  
NIFICANT IS THE PURCHASE OF 1,200 CLAYMORE MINES (UNDER  
TWO FMS CASES), AN ORDER LIKewise ACCEPTED BY WASHINGTON  
AND SEEMINGLY WITHIN REASONABLE PLANNING PROJECTIONS.  
THE REMAINDER OF OMAN'S ORDERS ARE RELATIVELY SMALL PUR-  
CHASES OF ITEMS FOR WHICH THE U.S. IS DEEMED THE BEST  
SOURCE TO FILL A NEED, SUCH AS 48 PILOTS ANTI-G SUITS.  
WE SUPPORT ALL SUCH REQUESTS WHERE THE REQUIREMENTS SEEM  
LOGICAL. (WE OMIT HERE POSSIBLE COMMERCIAL PURCHASES.)  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MUSCAT 01027 02 OF 03 051023Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MUSCAT 01027 03 OF 03 231028Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 H-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08  
MCE-00 /079 W  
-----033475 231039Z /16

P R 230540Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGER GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MUSCAT 1027

(9) ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PURCHASE OF ABOVE ITEMS. THE RE-SUPPLY OF TOW MISSILES WILL COST \$787,322. THE CLAYMORE MINES WILL COME TO CERTAINLY LESS THAN \$100,000. ALL OTHER PURCHASES ARE FAR LOWER IN PRICE. THESE AMOUNTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN APPRECIABLE STRAIN ON THE OMANI ECONOMY. WHILE IN A SENSE ALL MONEY SPENT ON ARMAMENTS INSTEAD OF CIVILIAN WELFARE IS A DIVERSION OF RESOURCES FROM DEVELOPMENT, THE IMPACT IN THESE PARTICULAR CASES NEED NOT BE A MAJOR CONCERN AS LONG AS THE MILITARY NEED IS VALID.

(10) ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF PROJECTED FMS PROGRAM. SINCE OMAN ALREADY HAS TOW LAUNCHERS, THE PROJECTED RE-SUPPLY OF MISSILES WILL NOT ALTER THE CHARACTER OF THE MILITARY ARSENAL. THE OTHER PROGRAMMED FMS ITEMS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE A RELATIVELY SMALL ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION.

(11) HUMAN RIGHTS IN OMAN IN RELATION TO PROJECTED FMS PROGRAMS. OMAN IS NOT WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS SHORTCOMINGS, BUT THE MAIN CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT COMPARED TO ITS PREDECESSOR IS ITS STRONG CONCERN FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE EDUCATION AND HEALTH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MUSCAT 01027 03 OF 03 231028Z

OF ITS CITIZENS. THE U.S. STRATEGY SHOULD BE TO PRESERVE THIS GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITS KNOWN ENEMIES -- WHO, WE SHOULD REMIND OURSELVES, ARE FAR LESS LIKELY TO TREAT THE OMANI PEOPLE WITH A SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE CONTINUED PROGRESS IN CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME. THE OMANI GOVERNMENT WILL BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO SUCH ENCOURAGEMENTS IF IT FEELS CNDIENT AGAINST SECURITY THREATS. HENCE A REASONABLY STRONG AND WELL EQUIPPED MILITARY FORCE CAN REALISTICALLY BE VIEWED AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PLUS.

(12) ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES. OMAN RECEIVES RELATIVELY LITTLE ECONOMIC AID ON CON-  
CESSIONARY TERMS FROM NON-ARAB SOURCES, THOUGH WE UNDER-  
STAND THAT SUCH PROGRAMS EXIST ON A LIMITED SCALE WITH  
SOME WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND MAY START SOON WITH  
JAPAN. OMAN'S MAIN SOURCES OF ECONOMIC AID ARE THE  
WEALTHY ARAB OIL STATES, CHIEFLY SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT,  
AND THE UAE. OMAN'S ARMED FORCES ARE EQUIPPED MAINLY WITH  
BRITISH WEAPONS, BOUGHT USUALLY ON CASH TEMRS BUT IN THE  
CASE OF SOME LRGE-FIGURE ITEMS PROBABLY ON CREDIT.  
THE PATTERN OF PRIMARY RELIANCE ON BRITIAIN WILL NO DOUBT  
CONTINUE. BRITISH PERSONNEL PREDOMINATE IN THE ARFEFZAGRVICES AT THE  
OFFICER LVEL AND IN THE CIVILIAN HIERARCHY  
OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THESE ARE BOTH CONTRACT  
PERSONNAL AND SERVING BRITISH OFFICERS ON SECONDMENT.  
OMANIZATION WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE THIS BRITISH PRESNCE,  
BUT ITS PROGRESS WILL BE SLOW. IRAN AND JORDAN SUPPLIED  
MILITARY HELP OO MAN DURING AND AFTER THE DHOFAR WAR.  
IRAN MAY SOON TAKE OVER THE PROGRAM OF TOW MISSILE MAIN-  
TENANCE PREVIOUSLY HANDLED BY THE U.S. THERE IS A SMALL  
PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN OMAN'S NAVY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MUSCAT 01027 03 OF 03 231028Z

(13) NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS POST, INCLUDING SUBSECTION F.  
3(B)(3)(D) PROJECTED COMMERCIAL PURCHASES. OMAN IS KNOWN  
TO BE INTERESTED IN BUYING UP TO THREE, THOUGH MOST PRO-  
BABLY TWO, C-130 AIRCRAFT FROM LOCKHEED. THEIR PURPOSE  
WOULD BE TO IMPROVE THE MOBILITY OF OMAN'S ARMED FORCES.  
HOWEVER, THIS DEAL DOES NOT AT PRESENT SEEM LIKELY TO BE  
CONSUMMATED. SAUDI FINANCING WOULD PROBABLY BE SOUGHT.  
THERE IS ALSO A POTENTIAL PURCHASE OF M-16 RIFLES TO  
REPLACE OMAN'S STOCK OF FN 7.62'S, WHICH IS CURRENTLY  
THE ARMY'S STANDARD INFANTRY WEAPON. THIS TRANSACTION,  
IF CARRIED OUT AT ALL, WILL PROBABLY BE COMMERCIALY  
NEGOTIATED WITH COLT RATHER THAN THROUGH FMS. OMAN  
WOULD SELL ITS FN 7.62'S ON THE WORLD MARKET TO HELP  
PAY FOR THE M-16'S. OTHER COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS COMING  
TO OUR ATTENTION INVOLVE THE POSSIBLE PURCHASE IN FY 1979

OF SEVERAL THOUSAND AC 5.56 RIFLES FROM STURM-RUGER OF  
SOUTHPORT, CONN. AND OF 75,000 ROUNDS OF M-1 CARBINE  
AMMUNITION FROM INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENT CORP. OF  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. STURM-RUGER MAY ALSO SELL  
PISTOLS TO THE OMANI POLICE FORCE.  
SIZER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** REPORTS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 23 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978MUSCAT01027  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780319-0010  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** MUSCAT  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780729/aaaaayni.tel  
**Line Count:** 392  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** dc45f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 167901  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1913007  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ANNUAL INTERGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, MU, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/dc45f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014